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The al-Qaeda-Taliban Nexus

Interviewer: Greg Bruno, Staff Writer
November 25, 2009

U.S. President Barack Obama has said the U.S. military campaign against Taliban forces in Afghanistan is aimed at preventing al-Qaeda from reestablishing a base that could be used to plot attacks against Americans. Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, al-Qaeda enjoyed refuge under the Taliban government, and Taliban leader Mullah Omar refused to turn over Osama bin Laden to international authorities. But in the eight years since the U.S.-led invasion drove the Taliban from power, relations between al-Qaeda and its former benefactors have changed considerably, experts say. As the Obama administration weighs increasing the U.S. military commitment in Afghanistan, experts Richard Barrett, Sajjan M. Gohel, Ronald E. Neumann, and Nigel Inkster present differing assessments on cooperation between al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban and the threat posed by their relationship.

Richard Barrett, Coordinator, UN Monitoring Team, al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee

If there is a money flow, it's from al-Qaeda to Taliban rather than Taliban to al-Qaeda, which is very interesting. It makes me think that al-Qaeda is, to a certain extent, having to buy in more and more to their association with Taliban on both sides of the border, and much less on Pakistan's side than [the] Afghan side. The Afghan Taliban is a nationalist movement, and they repeatedly say they're a nationalist movement. When they look at what they've gained from their association with al-Qaeda, [it's] pretty much heavy on the negative side rather than on the positive side. They got kicked out in October 2001. Maybe if al-Qaeda hadn't attacked the United States in September 2001, they'd still be in Kabul, they'd be the recognized government. Now they're still fiddling about, trying to get back. So although they are perfectly friendly and the al-Qaeda leaders say, "Yes, Mullah Omar is our leader," operationally, it's not so strong. And in reality, if the Taliban were engaged in government in Kabul, they wouldn't necessarily have al-Qaeda right behind them.

Could they keep them out is the key question. In many parts of Afghanistan, particularly in that area in Waziristan over the Durand Line [established in 1893 to demarcate British India from Afghanistan, the line today marks the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan], there's no way anyone's going to keep anybody out. There are hundreds of crossing points; there are villages which straddle the line; the whole countryside is like crumpled paper. But maybe they would try. And maybe al-Qaeda calculates that, and I think personally that al-Qaeda is much more comfortable and better off, and far better established now, on Pakistan's side of the border.

Sajjan M. Gohel, Director for International Security, Asia-Pacific Foundation

The Taliban have this Pashtunwali code about housing a guest. Al-Qaeda was deemed as a guest in Afghanistan; it was an important dynamic in the relationship between bin Laden and Mullah Omar. Where there have been problems, an issue that could perhaps be exploited further, is that the Afghan Taliban resented people like Ayman al-Zawahiri and his Egyptian brigade. Al-Zawahiri was very overbearing in the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and it created problems in the relationship. But nevertheless, the Taliban remained loyal to al-Qaeda. There is an ideological connection: al-Qaeda adopts a very strict interpretation of the Quran that is Wahabi/Salafi-esque; the Taliban is Deobandi. The relationship is close ideologically, and it is that relationship that binds them together. The Taliban is a number of different factions--whether you're looking at the Haqqani network [based in the city of Khost and led by a popular warlord, Jalaluddin Haqqani], or the Quetta Council [led by Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar] but they are based in Pakistan. In addition, they receive support from the Pakistan Taliban, [which is] already ideologically intertwined with groups like al-Qaeda; and that is why al-Qaeda Central, the Islamic Jihad Union, Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, and a whole plethora of groups are based in the tribal areas--because of the Taliban code of allowing these groups to be based there in providing sanctuary, in supporting them. That is not going to change.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan have been a very useful place for al-Qaeda, but I would also argue that the whole of Pakistan has served as a very useful sanctuary for al-Qaeda. Bear in mind all the key al-Qaeda leaders that have been captured were caught in major urban cities--Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Rawalpindi, Abu Zubaydah in Faisalabad, Tawfiq bin Attash and Ramzi Binalshibh were caught in Karachi--so it's not just the tribal areas, it's Pakistan as a whole that's served as a safe sanctuary for al-Qaeda. The United States has been ramping up the pressure, perhaps confining al-Qaeda's operational ability to spread its nexus; the Predator drones are keeping the group in check. So in many ways, their room to maneuver has been restricted, and for that reason they would want to go back into Afghanistan to have that greater apparatus, to have that greater infrastructure that was once there and to be able to plot and plan new attacks.

Ronald E. Neumann, President, American Academy of Diplomacy; former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

This idea that if the Taliban comes back, al-Qaeda either doesn't come with them--or is controllable or isn't a threat--is a very speculative theoretical foundation. This seems to me a very speculative basis, which has no real solid evidence to support it, on which to take a very large national security risk. And if you have a Taliban return with al-Qaeda, you then have effectively the strategic rear of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan. Just as you say you can't deal with Afghanistan without dealing with Pakistan, so it is absolutely impossible to say that you are going to deal with extremism in Pakistan while you lose the fight in Afghanistan.

You have seen a great deal of cross-merging of their capabilities. In the last two and a half years, you have seen an increase in the foreign fighter migration, a rapid increase in not only the types of more dangerous IEDs [improvised explosive devices]--both configurations of the bombs, triggering mechanisms, passage of techniques--that are being used in Iraq into Afghanistan. So in fact the prima facie evidence on the ground is for a tightening of the link. That's not a hard, fast, final piece of evidence. But if you look at what is physically happening, it belies the theory of separation.

Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk, International Institute for Strategic Studies; former Director for Operations and Intelligence, British Secret Intelligence Service

What's happening at the moment in both Afghanistan and Pakistan--continuing pressure by [the] International Assistance Security Force in Afghanistan and the current campaign by Pakistan against their Taliban problem--has created a situation in which the jihadist forces have come together to perhaps a greater extent than they might otherwise have done through a perception of a common threat. The Afghan Taliban were never that much in sympathy with al-Qaeda and the Afghan Arabs, and if you look at what happened in Afghanistan pre-9/11, you realize that the relationship was never very comfortable. If it came to be that the Taliban [was] able to recover all or part of Afghanistan, I think it improbable that [its] first act would be to invite al-Qaeda back in, not least because that would of course bring with it the obvious risk that [it] would continue to be the subject of U.S. and NATO attacks. So I don't think [the leadership] wants that. But they might not be able to prevent it. If you were to ask what al-Qaeda's leadership would like to do, the answer is they would like to get back to Afghanistan if they could. Their ejection from Afghanistan in 2001 was very much a kind of fall from grace--they were sort of ejected from the Garden of Eden--and things have not gone well for them really ever since.

Operationally, there is some evidence of al-Qaeda working with the Afghan Taliban. Al-Qaeda itself doesn't do real operations in Afghanistan--it's not in the position to do so--the most it can hope to be is a kind of force multiplier for the other entities that are already there. In that context it has been ready to provide some support and assistance to Afghan Taliban units--weapons training, some material assistance. Also, some of the foreign fighters are experienced fighters and know quite a lot about military tactics. So there has been, at the tactical level, a certain of amount of cooperation. [In Pakistan], al-Qaeda with the Tariki Taliban--the Pakistan Taliban--there are links, because the al-Qaeda leadership are in the tribal areas and they didn't just come there in 2001. One thing al-Qaeda [has] done quite skillfully and effectively is to create local alliances through intermarriage and business relationships. [It is] quite well established there.

US playing own game in sharing intel with India
Josy Joseph / DNA

New Delhi: 21 Dec.09: Is a grand American intelligence game unfurling in India? Is there a motive behind US agencies’ regular alerts and inputs on terrorist activities? Is a larger, murkier conspiracy at play?

India’s intelligence and security establishment is searching for answers as it looks deep into the concerted US assistance over the past few years, especially after the Mumbai attacks of November 2008. The worrylines have become deeper in the wake of the arrest of the mysterious David Coleman Headley who, reports and sources suggest, could well be an American agent who turned rogue.

Dependable sources told DNA that almost 80% of the intelligence alerts and leads on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and other ‘foreign’ terror groups after the 26/11 attacks last year had originally come from the US. The alerts have mostly turned out be false or unsubstantiated. The latest was last week’s warning about Pashtun-looking suicide bombers trained by the Taliban, planning to attack Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai.

In the post-26/11 days, instead of improving its intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities, India let the US ‘intelligence pipeline’ gather prominence and tighten its grip on the country’s terror intelligence, officials now admit. Most of them regret it.

The US agencies, both the FBI and CIA, have been regularly giving Indian agencies warnings about imminent terrorist attacks. These alerts have been used by the security establishment to issue warnings to the state polices and other agencies. These have also significantly contributed to public hysteria, and deployment of hundreds of security personnel.

Sources say that the motive behind American warnings has come under greater scrutiny after Indian intelligence agencies became convinced that Headley was an American mole who managed to penetrate the LeT network. The warning that the US gave India in September 2008, just two months before the Mumbai attacks — about the terrorists planning to target Mumbai landmarks and their reconnaissance of the targets — may well have come from Headley, the officers now believe.

However, suspicion of the US agencies did not start with the Headley case. Many who handled the investigations into the curious case of Ken Haywood — the US citizen whose internet connection was allegedly used by Indian Mujahideen operatives to send out an email warning of the Ahmedabad serial blasts in July 2008 — have had doubts since then.

While he was still under investigation by the anti-terror squad in Mumbai, Haywood managed to slip out of India despite a lookout notice against him in all Indian airports.

Sources say that the American agencies are providing “some or the other” intelligence input almost every alternative week. Officials also suspect a strategy behind the “random distribution of information” by the US agencies into the Indian system. They provide it to either IB and RAW in Delhi, or to Indian operatives outside India.

Just two weeks before the first anniversary of 26/11, India’s DIA was told by US military officials that some al Qaeda terrorists were planning attacks in India. It was surprising that such sensitive information should be passed on to the DIA, because otherwise the US cooperation on terror front is with the R&AW and IB.

In August, the US agencies issued a warning about a North Korean vessel MV Mu San, saying it was carrying suspected material for nuclear weapons or other suspect cargo. The ship was forced to berth at Kakinada, and a massive security operation was carried out. Worse, the entire cargo of the ship was offloaded and a team of nuclear scientists flown in from Mumbai to inspect the cargo. Nothing suspicious emerged.

In November, yet again, the American agencies alerted India about a suspicious ship of Malta registration, carrying radioactive material. The ship was detained in Chennai, but this time instructions were sent out not to offload the cargo.

More than one source told DNA that none of the Indian intelligence agencies have a consistent and independent watch on LeT. In effect, the Indian perceptions and public posturing on the militant group is mostly “shaped by the American inputs,” says a senior official. Such dependence “is a dangerous game,” says a former chief of an intelligence agency.

As the Americans started feeding the Indian system on a regular basis, the post-26/11 terror watch of India came to be heavily dependent on the US inputs, sources now admit. And instead of improving themselves, Indian intelligence agencies increasingly leaned on the US inputs. The only visible improvement was the system of collating terror alerts at IB’s MAC (multi agency centre), but most of the alerts they send out are flowing from the US.