This is the clearest admission of Pakistani involvement in
creating and supporting a terrorist infrastructure in Kashmir.
Yet it is unlikely that it will in any manner change things
Repeating in public what is already an open secret is hardly
a mea culpa. In the fluid world of Pakistani politics, President
Asif Zardari’s admission that militants of yesteryear are today’s
terrorists has the appearance of an apology. The rub is, does
the Pakistani establishment think that it was a mistake?
In an interview to the Daily Telegraph and in comments made
to retired civil servants, Zardari said militant “...groups
were not thrown up because of government weakness but as a matter
of policy.” Zardari said, “they were deliberately created and
nurtured as a policy to achieve some short-term tactical objectives...”
It is, by far, the clearest admission of Pakistani involvement
in creating and supporting a terrorist infrastructure in Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K).
While his statement deserves praise, it is unlikely that it
will in any manner change things in J&K.
The Pakistani army has simply invested too much military and
political capital in terrorist groups in J&K to change its
outlook and tactics. If cross-border terrorism were to be curbed,
it is axiomatic that Pakistan will lose a big bargaining chip
in any future talks on J&K. That will mean giving primacy
to diplomacy alone in dealing with India, a course of action
in which it has not had much faith since 1947.
The futility of such statements has another, political, aspect
to them. Pakistan has seen cycles of civil and martial rule
since 1958. This has resulted in a curious dichotomy in its
dealings with India. When the military is in command, it is
willing to be “realistic” with India, as it was, for example,
in the Pervez Musharraf era. When the country returns to civil
rule, politicians are handicapped in many ways to make meaningful
compromises (on J&K, to give one example). Doing that is
certain to undermine them politically with the people of Pakistan.
During such periods of civil rule, the army, too, is utterly
uncooperative with the established civil authorities.
The result is that Pakistan has two sets of players who are
willing to compromise with India individually, but not in tandem.
This is the situation that prevails in Islamabad at the moment.
