The Jammu and Kashmir Another Perspective




Recent events have once again generated some curiosity and interest in the issue of Jammu & Kashmir. Basic facts pertaining to this issue are well established. However, there has been a concerted dis-information campaign that presents a distorted historical account of the developments that led to the irrevocable accession of the state of Jammu & Kashmir to India; the subsequent wars inflicted by Pakistan on India and the current situation in the once tranquil and beautiful Kashmir Valley. The involvement of Pakistan in fomenting insurgency and terrorism in the border states of India, especially Jammu & Kashmir, has been well documented and accepted by all impartial observers. While the current violence and disturbances instigated and abetted by Pakistan in the Kashmir Valley are there for all to see, the historical perspective needs to be put in the correct, factual light. The following pages give the factual background of the issue of Jammu & Kashmir.

THE JAMMU AND KASHMIR ISSUE

Accession to India

1. The Accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India, signed by the Maharaja (erstwhile ruler of the State) on 26th October, 1947, was completely valid in terms of the Government of India Act (1935), Indian Independence Act (1947) and international law and was total and irrevocable. The Accession was also supported by the largest political party in the state, the National Conference. In the Indian Independence Act, there was no provision for any conditional accession. The Instrument of Accession executed by the Maharaja was the same as the ones executed by over 500 princely states in India. There has been no complication in any of the other cases. There would have been none in this case either, except for Pakistan's action in sending in tribal invaders first (in October 1947) and its own regular troops later (May 1948).

2. Lord Mountbatten's acceptance of the Instrument of Accession was unconditional. He said: "I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession". The Instrument of Accession was complete with the offer and acceptance.

3. There can, therefore, be no question of negotiating on the question of accession of the State of Jammu & Kashmir to India.

Reference to UN

4. India made a reference to the United Nations on 1st January 1948 under Article 35 of the Charter, which permits any member state to bring any situation, whose continuance is likely to endanger international peace and security, to the attention of the Security Council. The intention behind this reference was to prevent a war between the two newly independent countries, which would have become increasingly likely if the tribal invaders assisted first indirectly and then actively by the Pakistan army had persisted with their actions against India in Kashmir. The Government of India requested the Security Council "to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance which was an act of aggression against India”.

5. Pakistan consistently misled the world regarding its involvement in Kashmir: (a) It claimed initially in 1947 that it was not in any way assisting the tribal invaders and was only not actively opposing their passage out of fear that they may turn against the local Pakistani population. It was, however, clearly established that these invaders were being looked after in Pakistan territory, fed, clothed, armed and otherwise equipped and transported to J&K with the help, direct and indirect, of Pakistani officials, both military & civil. The first Governor General of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah claimed in a meeting with the then Governor General of India Lord Mountbatten that he was in a position "to call the whole thing off" subject to some of his demands being met. (b) Pakistan later claimed that its own forces were not involved directly in operations in Kashmir. But the UN Commission that visited India in July 1948 found Pakistani forces operating in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. The UNCIP Resolution of August 1948 documented the Pakistani aggression when it stated: “The presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the state of Jammu and Kashmir constitute a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council”. The UN sponsored mediator, Owen Dixon, was also constrained to record in his report of 15.9.1950 that "I was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of the State of J&K was crossed, on I believe 20 October 1947, by hostile elements, it was contrary to international law, and that when, in May 1948 as I believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the state that too was inconsistent with international law".

Non-implementation of UN Resolutions by Pakistan

6. Despite India's completely legal and valid position on Jammu & Kashmir, in order to find a solution to the situation created by Pakistan's aggression, India had accepted the option of holding a plebiscite in J&K. It had, however, been made clear by the Indian leaders that holding of such a plebiscite would be conditional upon Pakistan fulfilling Parts (I) & (II) of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August, 1948, which inter alia, required that all forces regular and irregular under the control of both sides shall cease fire; Pakistan would withdraw its troops, it would endeavour to secure withdrawal of tribesmen and Pak nationals and India will withdraw bulk of its forces once the UNCIP confirms that the tribesmen and Pak nationals have withdrawn and Pak troops are being withdrawn. India was also to ensure that the state government takes various measures to preserve peace, law and order. Indian acceptance of these UNCIP resolutions was also subject to several conditions and assurances given by UNCIP including that Pakistan would be excluded from all affairs of Jammu & Kashmir, "Azad J & K Government" would not be recognised, sovereignty of J & K government over the entire territory of the state shall not be brought into question, territory occupied by Pakistan shall not be consolidated, and Pakistani troops would be withdrawn completely. Pakistan never fulfilled these assurances.

Preconditions for Plebiscite Never Fulfilled by Pakistan

7. The Government of Pakistan wrecked any possibility of plebiscite being conducted by not implementing part II of the resolution, perhaps because it was fully aware of what the result of such an exercise would be. The Pakistani troops, which were to withdraw from the state, did not do so. As a result normal conditions under which a plebiscite could be held were never created.

8. India had accepted these resolutions, subject to assurances, (mentioned in para 6) and in the hope of having the matter resolved quickly. Pakistan, however, wrecked the implementation of the resolutions at that time by not fulfilling the preconditions. As V.K. Menon stated in the Security Council (763 Meeting, 23 January, 1957): "if an offer is made and it is not accepted at the time it is made, it cannot be held for generations over the heads of those who made it". With Pakistan's intransigence, and passage of time, the offer lapsed and was overtaken by events. In fact, the representative of India (M.C. Chagla) had stated in the Security Council as far back as 1964 (1088 meeting, 5 February 1964): "I wish to make it clear on behalf of my Government that under no circumstances can we agree to the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir".

9. The then Prime Minister of India, had in a statement in New York, stated on March 31, 1966 that: "any plebiscite today would by definition amount to questioning the integrity of India. It would raise the issue of secession - an issue on which even the United States fought a civil war not so very long ago. We cannot and will not tolerate a second partition of India on religious grounds. It would destroy the very basis of the Indian State." Today, thirty-six years later, the Pakistani position is even more untenable.

Solution Proposed by Resolutions: Time and Context Specific

10. Since 1957 there have been no UN resolutions on the substantive aspects of the Jammu and Kashmir issue. Time and circumstances have not stood still. More than four and a half decades have lapsed since the original proposals were made as a possible solution. They can no longer be considered valid. In fact, in his report (dated 29th April, 1957), the UN Representative, who was then President of the Security Council, Gunnar Jarring, after completing his mission to India and Pakistan in 1957, took note of larger realities of the sub-continent including in Jammu and Kashmir and stated: "The Council will, furthermore, be aware of the fact that the implementation of international agreements of an ad hoc character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change".

11. Dr. Frank Graham, the UNCIP representative stated in March 1958: “…the execution of the provisions of the resolution of 1948 might create more serious difficulties than were foreseen at the time the parties agreed to that. Whether the UN representative would be able to reconstitute the status quo which it had obtained ten years ago would seem to be doubtful….”.

12. Over fifty years after Partition, the ground situation in the state to which the resolutions referred to has considerably changed. Pakistan unilaterally ceded a part of the state to China in 1963. There has been a demographic change on the Pakistani side with generations of non-Kashmiris allowed to take residence in the parts of J&K occupied by Pakistan. If the resolutions had begun to lose relevance in 1957, they have far less relevance now.

13. The above position is increasingly being acknowledged by the world today. Highlighting the fact that the UNCIP resolutions did not come under Chapter VII, and were therefore not self enforcing, the UN Secretary General stated at a press conference in Islamabad in March 2001, that “the two parties discussing these issues and finding a peaceful way out, is the route I recommend”.

14. It is now widely acknowledged that bilateral dialogue, in accordance with the Simla Agreement, reiterated in the Lahore Declaration, is the only way to address all bilateral issues between India and Pakistan, including the issue of J&K. UK’s Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, stated in the British Parliament on 10th June 2002, that “if United Nations resolutions could have solved the matter, it would have been solved more than 50 years ago”. Speaking for the British Government, he said, “we think that there is not a huge amount of point in getting in a historiographical exercise about which position is correct. We have to deal with the here and now”, adding that a solution to this issue could be found only “by looking forward and by a direct dialogue between those two sovereign nations, India and Pakistan”.

Choice Made by the People of J&K and Elections in Kashmir

15. The people of Jammu and Kashmir could not wait indefinitely to decide their future. In any case the UN resolutions did not recognise or grant any role to Pakistan in the conduct of the plebiscite. "If Pakistan, therefore, has no part in the plebiscite, it really became a domestic matter for India". (V.K. Krishna Menon, UNSC, 800th meeting, 11 November, 1957). India waited several years for Pakistan to fulfil the preconditions. When that did not happen, the people of Jammu and Kashmir then convened a Constituent Assembly in 1951, which once again reaffirmed the Accession of the State to India in 1956 and finalised the Constitution for the State. The Jammu and Kashmir Constitution reaffirms that "the State is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India."

16. The people, therefore, were consulted. "We did not consult them privately; we did not consult them by selecting the people who were to be consulted. We consulted them by a normal process of democratic election - not even for a Parliament which we established, or the existing Government of Kashmir established, but for a Constituent Assembly". (V.K. Krishna Menon, UNSC, 800 Meeting, 11 November, 1957). In several subsequent local, State and national elections the people of Jammu and Kashmir have repeatedly exercised their democratic choice.

India Pakistan Discussions on J&K

17. India has always been willing to discuss all issues, including the issue of Jammu & Kashmir, with Pakistan. In fact, in the decades of the ‘50s and ‘60s, several rounds of bilateral discussions took place between India and Pakistan over 1950-51, 1953-54, 1956-57 and 1962-63, to resolve the differences over Kashmir. J&K is also one of the eight subjects identified for dialogue under the Composite Dialogue set up at India's initiative in 1998. A perusal of the records of these meetings makes it clear that they failed in their endeavour only because of Pakistan's intransigent, unrealistic, and on occasions, unifocal approach, which did not take into account either the moral and juridical aspects of the issue or the existing realities.

18. As in the UNSC, during these bilateral discussions, Pakistan has sought parity with India in terms of locus standi in Kashmir. This is untenable since the erstwhile ruler of J&K had duly acceded to India, the largest popular party had endorsed the Accession, and the people had subsequently ratified the earlier decisions. Pakistan, as the aggressor could not have parity with India, with which the accession of Jammu and Kashmir was complete and final.

1965 War: Its Implications

19. Pakistan tried to impose a military solution on J&K yet again in 1965, by instigating a war against India. The people of J&K resisted this new invasion. Pakistan's failure to impose this military solution and the efforts of the people of J&K to thwart the aims and designs of the Pakistani invaders are well documented.

20. By imposing a war, Pakistan negated the very reason for which a reference had been made to the UN in 1948. All the arrangements that were arrived at with Pakistan through the instrumentality of the Security Council were based on the integrity and inviolability of the cease-fire line established after the 1947-48 skirmishes. By violating this line in 1965, Pakistan rendered obsolete and dead the resolutions of 1948 and 1949, in the context of which the Cease-Fire Line had been established through the Karachi Agreement of 1949.

Simla Agreement - Its Implications

21. Pakistan imposed yet another war on India in 1971. After this conflict, bilateral talks were held in June-July 1972 and the 'Simla Agreement' signed on 2 July 1972. In terms of this Agreement, which was duly ratified by the two Governments in 1972 itself, the two countries undertook to resolve all differences bilaterally and peacefully. Pakistan, through its commitments enshrined in this Agreement, accepted the need to shift the J&K issue from the UN to the bilateral plane.

22. India’s stand has been clearly enunciated. Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. While India is prepared to resolve all differences with Pakistan through bilateral talks as envisaged in the Simla Agreement, there can be no compromise on India’s unity and sovereignty. The issue that remains to be resolved is the vacation by Pakistan of territory illegally occupied by it.

23. For meaningful bilateral negotiations, Pakistan must create the right climate by stopping its support to terrorism. There must be tangible and credible evidence of this on the ground. The Simla Agreement reiterated in the Lahore Declaration expressly forbids hostile propaganda, interference in internal Affairs and encouragement of any acts detrimental to maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations. It also enjoins respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Pakistan is violating all these provisions.

The Lahore visit of the Prime Minister of India

24. Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee took a historic initiative and visited Lahore from February 20-21, 1999. The visit was aimed at conveying India’s deep desire to establish peaceful, co-operative and friendly ties with Pakistan. Prime Minister Vajpayee proclaimed from the Minar-e-Pakistan that a stable, secure and prosperous Pakistan was in India’s interest. The Lahore Declaration, which committed the two countries to build trust and confidence and develop mutually beneficial co-operation to resolve outstanding issues including J&K through bilateral negotiations, provided a blue print for India-Pakistan relations into the 21st Century.

Kargil

25. However, the ink had barely dried on the Lahore Declaration that the Pakistani Army manifested its compulsive hostility towards India by launching a military operation in May 1999 across LoC in an attempt to occupy dominating heights along a 140 Km long stretch of Srinagar-Leh Highway. Its aim was to create a situation by which Pakistan would dominate the strategically important Kargil heights. India’s firm response forced Pakistani troops to retreat to their side of LoC. India’s policy of maintaining the sanctity of the LoC and the tremendous restraint shown by India in its firm action against the intruders without crossing the LoC found wide international support and endorsement.

Agra Summit

26. Notwithstanding, the continued sponsorship of cross border terrorism, on May 23, 2001 India again took the initiative to establish a high level political dialogue with Pakistan by inviting General Musharraf to visit India. The Pakistani President General Musharraf visited India from July 14-16, 2001 and had talks with Prime Minister Vajpayee in Agra. However, during the Summit, Pakistan demonstrated a unifocal approach, fixated entirely on one question and sought to make any improvement in relations conditional on prior resolution of the Kashmir issue. Pakistan was also reluctant to address India’s concerns relating to cross border terrorism. The hopes of forward movement in bilateral relations thus remained largely unattained.

Pakistan’s Interference and Support to Terrorism

27. The present situation in Kashmir has been created by Pakistan’s support to terrorism. This support to cross border terrorism is not only an attempt to unilaterally alter the status quo on the ground but also to undermine India’s secular fabric.

28. Pakistan’s support to cross border terrorism against India is now openly acknowledged by the international community. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the UK Government stated in the British Parliament on 10th June 2002, “A number of terrorist organisations-including Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, each of which I proscribed when I was Home Secretary-have been at the forefront of violent activity in the region. India has long charged that such terrorism has had the covert support of successive Pakistani Governments and, in particular, of the main intelligence agency in Pakistan, the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate-ISID. Her Majesty’s Government accept that there is a clear link between the ISID and those groups”.

29. US Secretary of State, Colin Powell stated on 10th June 2002, "Two weeks ago, we got assurances from President Musharraf that he would cease infiltration activity across the line of control… And then Deputy Secretary Armitage over this past week end got further assurances that cessation of activity would be visible and would be permanent and would be followed by other activities that had to do with the dismantling of the camps that led to the capacity to conduct these kinds of operation”.

30. The section on Pakistan in the Annual Report on Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 stated, “Pakistan’s military government, headed by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, continued previous Pakistani Government support of the Kashmir insurgency, and Kashmiri militant groups continued to operate in Pakistan, raising funds and recruiting new cadre”. The report further said that HUM, a State Department designated Foreign Terrorist Organisation, continued to be “active in Pakistan without discouragement by the Government of Pakistan”.

31. Through his January 12 and May 27 addresses President Musharraf made two promises. Firstly, that Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used to promote terrorism anywhere in the world. Secondly, that no organisation will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir.

Non-Applicability of ‘Self-determination’ to Integral Parts of States

32. Under the UN Charter, the principles of self-determination are meant to apply to colonial territories and not to integral parts of countries. Pakistan’s harping on “self-determination” today, against the principles advocated by the founders of Pakistan, are only a cover for territorial ambitions. The principles being espoused by Pakistan pose severe dangers to several countries in the world where multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies co-exist.

Kashmir Developments – An Internal Matter for India

33. In a diverse country like India, disaffection and discontent are not uncommon. Indian democracy has the necessary resilience to accommodate genuine grievances within the framework of our sovereignty, unity and integrity. Government of India has expressed its willingness to accommodate the legitimate political demands of the people of the state of J&K. However, Pakistan sponsored terrorists have terrorised the population and hindered political dialogue by intimidating or silencing voices of moderation that wish to engage in dialogue. The human rights of the people of J&K have been systematically violated by such terror tactics and the kidnappings and killings of innocent people by terrorists.

34. Jammu & Kashmir is an integral part of India. There can be no compromise on India’s unity and integrity.

 

KASHMIR ISSUE- BRIEF HISTORY

Introduction

The State of Jammu and Kashmir is known all over the world for its scenic grandeur and its spiritual ethos which is a blend of Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam mainly. During the last almost two decades, unfortunately, the region has seen worst form of terrorism, inspired by vested interests and manipulators of religion. The people of Jammu and Kashmir have suffered immensely for no fault of theirs. Terrorism has obliterated almost a generation, ruined the social, economic and cultural infrastructure of the region. It is an irony of the highest order that the land of peace and spirituality was devastated by the forces of hate, violence and subverted form of religion.

          It is not to say that the Kashmir problem is all about terrorism. It is a politico-economic problem which got vitiated due to terrorism. The issue is complex, having many facets, which cannot be described on a simplistic notion. A broad outline of the Kashmir problem as it has evolved is traced below: -

 Pre-Accession Developments

The State of Jammu and Kashmir became independent under the then Maharaja as soon as it was released from its allegiance to the British crown under the Indian Independence Act 1947. The Maharaja (Shriman Indar Mohinder Rajrajeshwar Maharajdhiraj Shri Hari Singh), as in case of rulers of other princely states, was given the option to decide whether to accede to Pakistan or to India. The British paramountcy over the princely states, numbering more than 500, lapsed on August, 15, 1947. As per the terms of British withdrawal and partition of India, the rulers of all the princely states were given the option of joining either of the two dominions-India or Pakistan, basing their decision on consideration of geographic embeddedness i.e contiguity to India or Pakistan and the wishes of their population. However, despite the seeming simplicity of these principles, they were not easily applicable to J&K. The State had a pre-dominantly Muslim population and a Hindu Ruler. Apart from territorial claims, the possession of J&K had extreme political significance   both for India and Pakistan, though for different reasons.

          In the 1920’s itself, dis-affection against the Dogra rule had been brewing among a group of ex-Aligarh Students which were latter to be known as “Reading Room Party”. In 1930, this group was joined by a young orator Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah who had just returned from Aligarh Muslim University. After an incident on July 13, 1931, in which 32 Muslim demonstrators were shot, Abdullah together with Mirwaiz of Kashmir, Mohammad Yousuf Shah took a leading role in the creation of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. This movement, though representing the Muslim elite interest to begin with, gradually got secularized and in 1939, the name of the party was changed to All J&K National Conference by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. However, some of the partymen led by Choudhary Ghulam Abbas opposed the formation of National Conference and parted ways retaining their identity as Muslim Conference. Thereafter, Sheikh Abdullah’s party started taking the shape of mass movement with the goals of freedom from autocracy and establishment of a popular rule. In May 1946, Abdullah launched Quit Kashmir agitation against Dogra rule and was arrested.

          Three days before independence, the newly appointed Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir Janak Singh tried to remove the insecurity caused by a clause in Indian. Independence Act for accession to either India or Pakistan, by asking the leaders of India and Pakistan to sign a standstill agreement. While Government of India asked for further negotiation on this request, the Govt. of Pakistan agreed to the agreement.

          Under pressure from Nehru, the Maharaja released Abdullah from prison on 29 Sept. 1947 and made him the head of the Emergency Administration. However, this step was noted with disapproval by Pakistan due to the apparent proximity of the Sheikh and his party NC with India. Meanwhile, the uprising in the Poonch against the ruler and subsequent military aggression by Pakistan and allied tribal forces complicated the problem.

Accession with India:

The military aggression by Pakistan forced the Maharaja to agree for accession with India. The State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to the dominion of India on Oct. 26, 1947, when Maharaja signed an instrument of accession and the Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, accepted the instrument. By the instrument of accession, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir accepted three subjects on which the Dominion Legislature “may make laws for the state”. They were Defence, External Affairs, and Communication. A schedule to the instrument listed precisely 16 topics of Legislation that fell under those three heads. Significantly, clause 5 of the instrument provided against any variation of its terms without the ruler’s consent. Clause 7 read thus: “Nothing in this instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India or fetter my discretion to enter into arrangements with the Government of India under any such future constitution”. Clause 8 said: “Nothing in this instrument affects the continuance of mu sovereignty in and over the state, or, save as provided by or under this instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me as ruler of this state or the validity of any law at present in force in this state”.  

          However, the legality of accession of J&K to India became a permanent source of difference between Pakistan and India. India contended that it had legal rights to all of pre-1947 J&K because of Maharaja’s Instrument of Accession as under the Indian Independence Act 1947, only the ruler was authorized to decide accession. However, on the other hand, Pakistan took a stand that Maharaja’s accession to India was illegal since it was a violation of his Standstill Agreement, which, however, had been violated by Pakistan in the days just before tribal invasion. In the face of Pakistani army assisted tribal invasion, India took the matter to the United Nations. Two UN resolutions were passed on Aug 13, 1948 and Jan 5, 1949, which inter-alia, envisaged a future reference to the people of whole of J&K under the supervision of United Nation’s Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). But, the pre-requisite was total withdrawal of Pakistani forces and Tribesmen from Kashmir, a condition which was never fulfilled. One third of the J&K remained under the control of Pakistan. Mountbatten’s and Nehru’s averments about referendum could also not crystallize because of the un-natural division of the State and non withdrawal of Pakistani forces.

            The Shimla agreement between India and Pakistan, after 1971 war leading to creation of Bangladesh, which called for bilateral resolution of all disputes and by whose virtue the ceasefire line was renamed as LOC, has also not been respected by the Government of Pakistan.

Installation of Popular Government:

          On Oct. 30, 1947, Maharaja issued an order, appointing Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as the head of the administration with power to deal with the emergency and also constituted a 23 member emergency council pending the formation of interim government. On March 05, 1948, Maharaja replaced the emergency administration by an interim government with Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as Prime Minister. The Council of Ministers was to function “on the principle of joint responsibility”. It was enjoined to convene a National Assembly based upon adult suffrage to frame a constitution.

Article 370 and the Delhi Agreement:

          Pursuant to a proclamation dated Nov. 25, 1949, and adoption of constitution of India on Jan. 26, 1950, by the J&K Government, the constitutional relationship of the state with the Union of India was shaped by the Constitution Order of 1950. This order specified matters corresponding to those in respect of which the state had acceded to the Indian Union according to the terms of Instrument of Accession. The Constituent Assembly of J&K convened on Oct. 31, 1951, was not only to frame constitution for the State but was also to take certain more important decisions regarding the future relationship of the State with the Union. After prolonged deliberations between four representatives namely Shiekh Mohammad Abdullah, Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beigh, Moulana Mohammad Saeed Masoodi and Moti Ram Baigra, who were nominated from J&K to the Constituent Assembly of India, the constitutional position of the state was determined in the constitution of India. Taking into account the special circumstances in which J&K State was placed; a special constitutional arrangement was evolved and provided in Article 370, which defines the position of Jammu and Kashmir.

          The instrument of accession signed with Government of India was to be ratified by constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir. On 1st May 1951, Yuvraj Karan Singh, the Governor, issued a proclamation outlining the following directions:-

1)         A Constituent Assembly consisting of representatives of the people, elected on the basis of adult franchise, shall be constituted forthwith for the purposes of framing a Constitution for the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

2)            The vote at election shall be direct and (by) secret ballot:

3)            The Constituent Assembly shall have power to act notwithstanding any vacancy in the membership thereof: and

4)            The Constituent Assembly shall frame its own agenda and make rules for the governing of its procedure and the conduct of its business.

The Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly was elected in Oct. 1951. From June to August 1952, Govt. of India and state leaders discussed the relationship between Delhi and Srinagar to be reflected in the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution.

On 24 August, 1952, Delhi Agreement was announced with following significant contents; which was the first major change post-1947 in the relationship of J&K with rest of country.

1)   All powers other than those specified in the Instrument of Accession to remain with the State.

2)   The State government was empowered to regulate the rights    of the State’s permanent residents.

3)   Fundamental rights of the Indian constitution to be made  applicable to the State, but with some modifications so that reforms could be carried out without paying         compensation.

4)   Hereditary rulership to be abolished.

5)   Disputes mentioned in Article 131 of the Indian Constitution (centre-state and between states) to be dealt   with by the Indian Supreme Court.

6)   The jurisdiction of the National Election Commission to be          confined to parliamentary and presidential / vice presidential elections.

7)   Article 352 (declaration of emergency) to apply to the state in the case of external aggression, but in the case        of internal disturbances it could be applied only with the   approval of the State government.

8)   Article 356 (President’s rule) and 360 (financial emergency) shall not be applicable to the State.

          Immediately thereafter, agitation started in Jammu against Article 370 and Delhi agreement which made Abdullah suspicious of and hostile to India. The agitation took a distinct religious hue and threatened to spread to Indian heartland. Abdullah started talking in threatening tones, bracing up the Independent Kashmir option every now and then. He also met American diplomats and Congressmen while a visit abroad and sought their support for an Independent Kashmir, modeled on Switzerland. Meanwhile, the instrument of accession had not yet been ratified by the Constituent Assembly. Nehru met Abdullah in May 1953 but their differences could not be bridged. This finally culminated in Abdullah’s arrest on Aug. 9, 1953.

Post 1953 Developments

Six months after Abdullah’s ouster, on 15 Feb. 1954, the State constituent Assembly confirmed accession. Two months later, Customs barriers with the state were lifted. In May 1954, through Constitution (application to J&K) Order, the jurisdiction of the Centre was extended to cover all subjects in the Union list, not just on three subjects as was the case till then. The State constitution came into force on 26 Jan 1957.

In 1958, the State was brought under purview of All India Services.

It also ceased to be financially autonomous.

The permit system that governed the entry of non-J&K Indian citizen to the State was removed in 1959.

The same year, the jurisdiction of Supreme Court was brought in and in 1961 jurisdiction of Election Commission was announced.

Article 356 of the Indian constitution that empowers Delhi to take over a State Government was extended to J&K in Dec. 1964.

The Delhi appointed Governor replaced J&K Legislative Assembly appointed Saddar-e-Riyasat in March 1965.

          The J&K Governor has powers that no other Governor in India has. Under section 92 of J&K constitution, he can assume any or all functions of the Govt. These powers had been meant for Saddar-e-Riyasat responsible to the State legislature. Their transfer to Delhi appointed person has been seen by many to have made position of the J&K Chief Minister weaker than the chief ministers of other Indian States.

 Post 1983 and present turmoil:

          Dismissal of the National Conference government of Farooq Abdullah on July 02, 1984 was viewed by some as a severe blow to the dignity and identity of J&K. However, the alliance of National Conference with the Congress party of India (the same party whose government had dismissed the Farooq Govt) in 1986 made people lost faith in the NC. This created a sort of political vacuum in the valley and its immediate impact was that a space was created for entry of rightist political parties those were at the fringe of politics in Kashmir till that time. Thus, there was formation of coalition of numerous such parties and groups in 1986. This coalition called Muslim United Front (MUF), aimed at combing religion with politics. The overall impact of this was that the politics of secular identity got substituted by a politics of the Muslim identity. The rigged Assembly election of 1987 and its outcome, however, proved to be the catalyst for the eventual extreme response in Kashmir. Consequently, there developed a general sense of disillusionment not merely with the electoral politics but with the entire frame- work of democratic structure. This complete state of alienation set the stage for onset of militancy in the state in the late 80’s as Pakistan had already done the ground work for the same and was only waiting for the right opportunity to fish in the trouble waters. The period of late 80’s witnessed the intermingling of the external and internal dimension of conflict with hostility between India and Pakistan intensifying and simmering discontent of people getting the moral and material support of Pakistan which culminated in form of an insurgency in the valley.

View point from various regions:

View point of people of Jammu region:

The Jammu region comprising of ten districts has roughly half of the population of J&K State. The so called concessions granted to Kashmir from time to time have played a role in moulding the thinking of Jammu inhabitants towards a demand for a special dispensation, be it creation of a separate State or some other measure that would meet the ambitions and demands of the region,. Though separatists leaders tried to establish base in Jammu region particularly Rajouri, Poonch and Doda districts to show that they are real representatives of the people of the State, they did not succeed. Rajouri and Poonch districts having significant population of Pahari speaking people have their distinct aspirations. They do not support separatism by and large, but in view of division caused among families of the region by partition, they largely wish the cross border movement to be restored on full scale enabling them to meet their nears and dears as also starting trade through these routes which would benefit them economically. In Jammu region, only district Doda remained affected by separatist activities but after the recent change of guard in the State, people, by and large, have started participating in developmental works and political activities despite threats from terrorists who earlier had been able to establish strong pockets there.

View point of people of valley

Kashmir comprises of 14 districts including two districts of Leh and Kargil. District Leh is predominantly inhabited by Buddhists who have all along been nationalists and as such never were part of separatist politics. Having been neglected during the last five decades and having a poor connectivity with rest of the country (the road is operative for only for about six months), the people of the area have been critical of the Government. This discontent resulted in agitation by the people of the area for a special status. The State Government in consultation with various organizations of the region, as also Government of India decided to form a Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) which would  address the needs of the people in a better way. District Kargil is predominantly inhabited by Shia Muslims, who also did not form a part of the separatist politics and remained aloof. The population of the Kargil has felt neglected by the successive Governments of the J&K State. Leh district has air connectivity with rest of the country, while Kargil remains permanently cut off for six months because of closure of Srinagar-Leh highway.

Rest of 12 districts of Kashmir valley were nearly completely embroiled in the turmoil. The futility of death and destruction caused in the events of last 16 years has dawned upon masses now. They are fed-up with violence and want a dignified return of peace. However, that does not mean that they would agree to status-quo. The general feeling in the valley especially amongst intellectuals and the working class is that the Government should come out with a solution which would save their faces. And in this direction, restoration of pre-1953 position seems as one of the main alternatives, which has most takers. A major change seen among the general masses in Kashmir, after having seen the black face of terrorism, is that the takers for State’s accession with Pakistan have reduced to a negligible proportion. Most of the people would not like to secede from India but enjoy an autonomous special status within the domains of India. They would also like LoC to be made irrelevant and people of both sides to have easy access without any restriction, besides free trade through Srinagar-Muzafferabad road.

 
 

Editorial


The people of Pakistan are currently in the grip of worst ever terrorism, the country has seen. It is spreading quickly from Taliban strongholds in North-West and FATA to the mainland including the major cities of Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. It would hardly serve any purpose in reiterating here the universally known role of ISI and a section of Pakistan Army in taking the country to the precipice of disaster. more...