The Pakistan Army has two kinds of officers: nationalist jihadis
and Islamist jihadis", says Arif Jamal, a Pakistani scholar
at Harvard University and author of the forthcoming book, "Shadow
War: the Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir". According to
him, the nationalist jihadis would like nothing better than to
snatch Jammu and Kashmir from India and see India break up. The
Islamist jihadis, on the other hand, hate all infidels. They consider
the US as the bigger enemy and see India as a sideshow which can
be taken on after they have vanquished the "Great Satan".
Arif believes that the Islamists are on the ascendant and will
eventually replace the nationalist jihadists.
There are many who will view Arif's analysis of the Pakistan Army
with a great deal of scepticism. But this they will do at their
own peril. Just as every bearded, conservatively dressed, non-drinking,
five-time namazi is not a terrorist, similarly every clean-shaven
military officer, who speaks English with a clipped accent, dresses
up immaculately in Western suits, enjoys his whisky and generally
follows a liberal life-style isn't necessarily a moderate or a
liberal. And yet a lot of people think that the army General Musharraf
left is very different from the army he inherited, and that the
peace process between India and Pakistan has drastically reduced
the hostile perception of India among Pakistan army officers.
Alluring as this thought is, it begs the question that if, despite
the peace process, officers of the Indian Army are not only deeply
suspicious of Pakistan but even hostile, how is it possible that
the entire officer corps of the Pakistan Army has undergone such
a radical transformation. Although mutual animus among officers
of the two armies is entirely understandable, there is a big difference
between the two armies. The Indian Army is firmly under civilian
control and cannot even countenance going against the orders of
the government. The Pakistan Army, on the other hand, is a law
unto itself and can easily sabotage any peace initiative that
the civilian government in Islamabad might want to take with India.
Among the most glaring failures of General Musharraf, who before
his transmogrification into an "enlightened moderate",
was a nationalist jihadi (he openly defended a terrorist organisation,
Harkatul Mujahideen, held a brief for the Taliban and supported
the jihad in Kashmir), has been his inability to purge the Pakistan
Army of its jihadist leanings. Perhaps, he failed because the
jihadi culture is deeply imbedded in the psyche of the Pakistan
Army, and increasingly its people. May be, he failed because there
were just too many of them in the Army and it wasn't prudent to
carry out a cleansing operation without risking a putsch. Also
hindering the somewhat half-hearted attempts to rid the Army of
its jihad ethos was the desire to retain the jihad option for
achieving strategic goals in the future. Finally, after his historic
U-turns, first on Afghanistan (which riled the Islamists) and
then on Kashmir (which would have rankled with the nationalists),
General Musharraf had become deeply unpopular and was probably
in no position to push through the ideological reforms in the
Army to the extent he might have liked.
Let alone the entire rank and file of the Army, even General Musharraf's
close associates remain unreconstructed jihadists, totally impervious
to any sort of enlightened moderation, much less enlightened national
interest. A recent TV interview with Lt- Gen. Jamshed Kiyani,
a former sidekick and now bitter critic of Musharraf, was quite
a revelation to understand what goes in the Pakistan Army. In
the interview Kiyani blasted Musharraf for "slavish subservience"
to the US, but conveniently avoided listing Pakistan's options
after 9/11. It appeared as though he was dying to blurt out that
the Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons was a guarantee against
any hostile action by the US. Quite obviously, for Kiyani and
his ilk (a large tribe, one dare say) nuclear weapons are weapons
of use and not weapons of deterrence.
As long as Musharraf was the Army Chief, the officer corps kept
their anger and resentment in check and followed orders of the
Army Chief, even if sullenly. But as soon as Musharraf stepped
down as Army Chief, the restraints and constraints imposed by
the Musharraf dispensation seem to have loosened. As a result,
there are disturbing signs that both the nationalist and Islamist
jihad is back in fashion. It is still not quite clear whether
this is happening because the new Army Chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani,
has allowed it to happen or because he has still not been able
to establish his authority in the organisation. Whatever the case,
it means that the urge for jihad is alive and kicking.
For the moment, however, serving Army officers are making politically
and diplomatically correct noises and are not coming out openly
in favour of jihad. Instead, the lead has been taken by the ex-servicemen
many of whom held important positions under Musharraf, and whom
even after retirement never opened their mouths in public as long
as Musharraf was the boss. But with regime change, they have rediscovered
their basic, or should we say baser, instincts. They are targeting
Musharraf not because they want to strengthen democracy but because
they want a return to the jihadist policies of the 1980's and
1990's. These ex-servicemen are followers of the "strategic
defiance" school, which aims to use jihad as an instrument
of foreign and domestic policy under the protective umbrella of
Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
The big question is whether the noise being made by these spent
bullets of the Pakistan Army will find resonance in the serving
officer corps. There is reason to believe that the jihadists have
received encouragement from the ambiguous statements that General
Kiyani has made on Kashmir and the peace moves he has initiated
with the Taliban in the Pashtun belt. For instance, within days
of Asif Zardari's interview to an Indian TV channel in which he
clearly pointed to a radically different approach to solving the
Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan, General Kiyani, during
a visit to the forward areas along the LoC in Pakistan-Occupied
Kashmir, seemed to negate Zardari's comments by reaffirming "the
Army's commitment to the Kashmir cause in line with the aspirations
of the nation".
The rising incidents of infiltration, repeated violations of the
ceasefire along the LoC, the re-emergence of jihadi groups who
are once again holding public meetings, the re-opening of the
offices of these groups, talk of relaxing the ban on some of the
jihadi organisations ostensibly to bring them into the political
system, and the sudden re-activation of the propaganda machinery
to incite the Sikhs, all seem to suggest that tensions with India
are going to be ratcheted up. This is something that will certainly
please the nationalist jihadi lobby in the Army, and will even
find support from the Islamist jihadis.
Clearly, if Pakistan is once again reverting to the jihadi adventurism
of the closing decades of the 20th century, then it will be making
a terrible miscalculation. In the past, Pakistan had to contend
only with India. But the situation today is vastly different.
Any adventurism by Pakistan can easily invite the wrath of the
world, especially the West. The question is whether the Pakistan
Army gives in to its jihadi fervour or whether the instinct for
self-preservation acquires primacy. If it's the latter, then there
is hope for Pakistan. But if it is the former, then catastrophe
is unavoidable.
