Islam and the West
Terrorism is just a tactic. Islamism
is the enemy
By Daniel Pipes
If you cannot name your enemy, how can you defeat it? Just as
a physician must identify a disease before curing a patient, so
a strategist must identify the foe before winning a war. Yet,
Westerners have proven reluctant to identify the opponent in the
conflict the US Government variously (and euphemistically) calls
the "global war on terror," the "long war",
the "global struggle against violent extremism", or
even the "global struggle for security and progress".
This timidity translates into an inability to define war goals.
Two high-level US statements from late 2001 typify the vague and
ineffective declarations issued by Western Governments. Secretary
of Defence Donald Rumsfeld defined victory as establishing "an
environment where we can in fact fulfil and live (our) freedoms."
In contrast, Mr George W Bush announced a narrower goal, "the
defeat of the global terror network" -- whatever that undefined
network might be.
"Defeating terrorism" has, indeed, remained the basic
war goal. By implication, terrorists are the enemy and counter-terrorism
is the main response.
But observers have increasingly concluded that terrorism is just
a tactic, not an enemy. Mr Bush effectively admitted this much
in mid-2004, acknowledging that "We actually misnamed the
war on terror." Instead, he called the war a "struggle
against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies
and who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience
of the free world".
A year later, in the aftermath of the 7/7 London transport bombings,
British Prime Minister Tony Blair advanced the discussion by speaking
of the enemy as "a religious ideology, a strain within the
world-wide religion of Islam". Soon after, Mr Bush himself
used the terms "Islamic radicalism," "militant
jihad," and "Islamo-fascism". But these words prompted
much criticism and he backtracked.
By mid-2007, Mr Bush had reverted to speaking about "the
great struggle against extremism that is now playing out across
the broader Middle East". That is where things now stand,
with US Government agencies being advised to refer to the enemy
with such nebulous terms as "death cult", "cult-like",
"sectarian cult" and "violent cultists".
In fact, that enemy has a precise and concise name: Islamism,
a radical utopian version of Islam. Islamists, adherents of this
well funded, widespread, totalitarian ideology, are attempting
to create a global Islamic order that fully applies the Islamic
law (shari'ah).
Thus defined, the needed response becomes clear. It is two-fold:
Vanquish Islamism and help Muslims develop an alternative form
of Islam. Not coincidentally, this approach roughly parallels
what the allied powers accomplished vis-à-vis the two prior
radical utopian movements, fascism and Communism.
First comes the burden of defeating an ideological enemy. As in
1945 and 1991, the goal must be to marginalise and weaken a coherent
and aggressive ideological movement, so that it no longer attracts
followers nor poses a world-shaking threat. World War II, won
through blood, steel, and atomic bombs, offers one model for victory,
the Cold War, with its deterrence, complexity and nearly-peaceful
collapse, offers quite anotherVictory against Islamism, presumably,
will draw on both these legacies and mix them into a novel brew
of conventional war, counter-terrorism, counter-propaganda, and
many other strategies. At one end, the war effort led to the overthrow
of the Taliban Government in Afghanistan; at the other, it requires
repelling the lawful Islamists who work legitimately within the
educational, religious, media, legal and political arenas.
The second goal involves helping Muslims who oppose Islamist goals
and wish to offer an alternative to Islamism's depravities by
reconciling Islam with the best of modern ways. But such Muslims
are weak, being but fractured individuals who have only just begun
the hard work of researching, communicating, organising, funding,
and mobilising.
To do all this more quickly and effectively, these moderates need
non-Muslim encouragement and sponsorship. However unimpressive
they may be at present, moderates, with Western support, alone
hold the potential to modernise Islam and thereby to terminate
the threat of Islamism.
In the final analysis, Islamism presents two main challenges to
Westerners: To speak frankly and to aim for victory. Neither comes
naturally to the modern person, who tends to prefer political
correctness and conflict resolution, or even appeasement. But
once these hurdles are overcome, the Islamist enemy's objective
weakness in terms of arsenal, economy, and resources means it
can readily be defeated.