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Al-Qaeda
Many terrorists active in Jammu & Kashmir received training in the same
madrasas, or Muslim seminaries, where Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters
studied, and some received military training at camps in Taliban-ruled
Afghanistan. Leaders of some of these terror groups also have al-Qaeda
connections. The long-time leader of the Harakat ul-Mujahideen group,
Fazlur Rehman Khalil, signed al-Qaeda's 1998 declaration of holy war,
which called on Muslims to attack all Americans and their allies.
Maulana Masood Azhar, who founded the Jaish-e-Mohammed organization,
traveled to Afghanistan several times to meet Osama bin Laden. Azhar's
group is suspected of receiving funding from al-Qaeda, U.S. and Indian
officials say. In 2006, al-Qaeda claimed to have established a wing in
Kashmir.
Obstacle to Peace
Despite a resumption of formal peace talks between India and Pakistan in
2004, militant attacks continue to hinder progress towards a sustainable
deal on Kashmir. After New Delhi and Islamabad agreed to launch a
landmark bus service in February 2005 across the cease-fire line,
militants vowed to target the service. In April of the same year, one
bus survived a grenade attack.Both India and Pakistan have been accused
of committing human rights violations in Kashmir, exacerbating the
antagonism and mutual distrust both states have for one another. Talks
were effectively put on hold in 2008 after India accused the ISI and
Pakistani authorities of being complicit in the Mumbai attacks.
Pakistan’s new generation of terrorists
Introduction
Pakistani authorities have long had ties to militant groups based on
their soil. They have supported some organizations fighting Indian
forces in Jammu & Kashmir and played a pivotal role in supporting the
Afghan resistance against the Soviets throughout the 1980s. In the
1990s, Pakistan’s government supported the Taliban’s rise in Afghanistan
in the hope of having a friendly government in Kabul. But with Pakistan
joining the United States as an ally in its war against Islamic
extremists since 9/11, experts say Islamabad has seen harsh blowback on
its policy of backing militants operating abroad. Leadership elements of
al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, along with other terrorist groups, have
made Pakistan’s tribal areas (the semi-autonomous region along the
Afghan border) their home. Pakistan’s deployment of troops in the tribal
areas has generated resentment among tribal leaders and others who
sympathized with the Taliban. In recent years, many new terrorist groups
have emerged in Pakistan, several existing groups have reconstituted
themselves, and a new crop of militants have taken control, more violent
and less conducive to political solutions than their predecessors.
Terrorist Groups
Many experts say it is difficult to determine how many terrorist groups
are operating out of Pakistan. Most of these groups tend to fall into
one of the five distinct categories laid out by Ashley J. Tellis, a
senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in
January 16, 2008, testimony (PDF) before a U.S. House Foreign Affairs
subcommittee:
Sectarian: Groups such as the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Shia Tehrik-e-Jafria, which are engaged in
violence within Pakistan;
Anti-Indian: Terrorist groups that operate with the alleged support of
the Pakistani military and the intelligence agency Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Muhammad
(JeM), and the Harakat ul-Mujahadeen (HuM).
Afghan Taliban: The original Taliban
movement and especially its Kandahari leadership centered around Mullah
Mohammad Omar, believed to be now living in Quetta;
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates: The organization led by Osama bin Laden and
other non-South Asian terrorists believed to be ensconced in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Rohan Gunaratna of the
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in
Singapore says other foreign militant groups such as the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad group, the Libyan Islamic Fighters
Group and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement are also located in
FATA;
The Pakistani “Taliban”: Groups consisting of extremist outfits in the
FATA, led by individuals such as late Baitullah Mehsud, now Hakimullah
Mehsud, the chieftain of the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan, Maulana
Faqir Muhammad and Maulana Qazi Fazlullah of the
Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TSNM), and Mangal Bagh Afridi of
the Lashkar-e-Islami in the Khyber Agency.
The Pakistani Taliban
Supporters of the Afghan Taliban in the tribal areas transitioned into a
mainstream Taliban force of their own as a reaction to the Pakistani
army’s incursion into the tribal areas, which began in 2002, to hunt
down the militants. This Pakistani Taliban is organizationally distinct
from the Afghan Taliban. Gunaratna says it is clear that Afghan Taliban
only fights in Afghanistan, emphasizing it is the Pakistani Taliban that
is operating in Pakistan against the state. Analysts say it is this
arrangement with the Pakistani authorities that keeps members of the
Afghan Taliban safe from arrest or transfer to U.S. or NATO forces based
in Afghanistan. But Pakistani authorities have repeatedly denied any
involvement with the Taliban and have often said the problem lies within
Afghanistan, saying Taliban sympathizers from Afghanistan slip across
the border to recruit in refugee camps in Pakistan.
Experts say most adult men in Pakistan’s tribal areas grew up carrying
arms but it is only in the last few years that they have begun to
organize themselves around a Taliban-style Islamic ideology pursuing an
agenda much similar to that of the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan. The
people of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and FATA, as
well as the adjacent eastern regions of Afghanistan, are overwhelmingly
Pashtun and share ethnic and linguistic links. Hassan Abbas, a research
fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, writes
(PDF) in a January 2008 paper that the Pakistani Taliban have
effectively established themselves as an alternative to the traditional
tribal elders. Abbas adds that the Taliban killed approximately 200 of
the tribal leaders and these indigenous Taliban groups coalesced in
December 2007 under the umbrella of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). He
writes that a shura (consultative council) of more than 40 senior
Taliban leaders established the TTP under the militant commander
Baitullah Mehsud from South Waziristan.
TTP not only has representation from all of FATA’s seven agencies
(please refer to this interactive map of the area) but also from several
settled districts of the NWFP. According to some estimates, the
Pakistani Taliban collectively have around 30,000 to 35,000 members.
Among their other objectives, the TTP has announced a defensive jihad
against the Pakistani army, enforcement of sharia, and a plan to unite
against NATO forces in Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities accused the
group’s leader, Mehsud, of assassinating former Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto in December 2007.
Analysts say it may be too early to say how successful the TTP will be
in unifying the disparate militant groups across diverse tribal regions,
or how loyal the tribes will be to Mehsud’s leadership.
Changing Face of Terrorism
The new Taliban are fiercer, younger and impatient for results, say
experts. Steve Coll, president of the New America Foundation, a
Washington-based think tank, tells CFR.org the Afghan-oriented Taliban
of the 1990s had a sort of a political cover in Pakistan. But what’s
happening now, he says, is that those traditional intermediaries between
the Taliban and the establishment are being displaced by “a younger
generation of more violent radical leaders who are in a hurry and have
no patience with compromise with the state.” Coll adds: “These are like
hard-core breakaway children militias of the sort you encounter in
failed states in Africa and elsewhere,” running roadblocks, moving
around in bands on highways in the tribal areas, and operating under
some notion of political control under this Tehrik-i-Taliban set-up.
“But they are the law and that is real change.”
This new generation of terrorists is also more willing to engage in
suicide attacks; there were more than fifty in 2007, compared to no more
than twenty between 2001 and 2007. Gunaratna attributes this to the
influence of al-Qaeda. He says bin Laden’s group is training most of the
terrorist groups in FATA. “Al-Qaeda considers itself as the vanguard of
the Islamic movement,” Gunaratna says, and has introduced its practice
of suicide bombings to both the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban.
“Pakistani Taliban are a younger generation of more violent radical
leaders who are in a hurry and have no patience with compromise with the
state.”- Steve Coll.
Pakistan’s tribal areas are also experiencing growing extremism. Like
their Taliban predecessors in Afghanistan, the younger militants
consider music, TV, and luxuries like massage parlors un-Islamic and
wage war against them. Local Taliban leaders in the tribal agencies tell
men to keep beards and women to wear the veil. In a January 2008 article
in the New York Times magazine, writer Nicholas Schmidle quotes Maulana
Fazlur Rehman, chief of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F), a pro-Taliban
religious party: “When the jihad in Afghanistan started, the maliks
[tribal leaders] and the old tribal system in Afghanistan ended; a new
leadership arose, based on jihad. Similar is the case here in the tribal
areas.”
Terrorist Breeding Ground
Pakistan’s tribal region is governed under the colonial-era Frontier
Crimes Regulations (FCR) Act by a political agent in each of the seven
tribal agencies. Experts say the tribes have long struggled with each
other over economic or territorial issues. Coll says what has happened
in FATA during the last twenty years is “almost like painting a coat of
Islamist radicalization over this complicated structure of smuggling and
competition” among the tribes. He says “by painting this coat of
Islamist ideology over certain areas of FATA, it’s changed the dynamic
of competition in ways that are really complicated and very hard for us
to understand on the outside.”
Counterterrorism Challenges
Pakistani authorities are struggling to confront the changing dynamics
in the region. There is growing criticism both within and outside
Pakistan that the army does not have the capacity to fight insurgency
within its borders. Militants increasingly target the army with suicide
attacks and in August 2007, the kidnapping of around 250 soldiers by
Baitullah Mehsud in FATA’s South Waziristan posed a huge embarrassment
for Pakistan. These soldiers were only released when the government
released twenty-five militants associated with Mehsud. The army faces a
tough fight not only in the tribal areas but increasingly the settled
areas of NWFP, which are being targeted by militants. In 2007, the
militant group TSNM led by Maulana Fazlullah took control of large areas
in the Swat valley, previously a tourist destination. The army, after a
long fight, reclaimed it but experts say hundreds of militants continue
to operate there.
Coll questions the will of the Pakistani military to confront the new
Taliban groups. He writes in the New Yorker that there was evidence to
suggest that “some current and former Pakistani military and
intelligence officers sympathize with the Islamist insurgents with whom
they are notionally at war.” U.S.officials have made similar allegations
but Pakistani officials have pointed to the death of about a thousand
Pakistani soldiers fighting the war on terror and several attempts made
by the militants on President Musharraf’s life as proof that such
allegations are not true.
“[A] strategy to manage the threat of terrorism is to co-opt the groups
that are in the margins and draw them to mainstream politics to create
opportunities for them.”- Rohan Gunaratna.One approach taken by Islamabad is to deploy the Frontier Corps,
Pakistan ’s paramilitary organization that operates in the FATA and has
played an important part because of their local language skills and
familiarity with the local terrain. But numerous defections and refusals
to fight and follow orders have taken place within the Frontier Corps.
Rand Corporation expert Christine C. Fair, in January 2008 testimony to
a U.S. House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, says while its officers are
seconded from the Pakistan army, its cadres are drawn from the local
Pashtun population. According to Fair, the Corps is “inadequately
trained and equipped and has been ill-prepared for counter-insurgency
operations in FATA.” Fair also says the Corps “was used to train the
Taliban in the 1990s and many are suspected of having ties to that
organization.” Yet many experts believe that Frontier Corps has a much
better chance than the Pakistani army in securing the tribal areas.
Washington plans a significant increase in current military assistance
to the Frontier Corps. Its effort to secure the tribal belt includes a
proposal by U.S. Special Operations Command to train and arm tribal
leaders to fight Al-Qaeda and Taliban and a $750 million aid package for
the border area over the next five years.
Another approach taken by the Pakistani government in the tribal areas
was to sign some peace agreements with the tribal leaders but most of
them have failed so far and critics, including many in Washington, said
they only ended up strengthening the militants. In January 2008, news
reports saying the United States was considering sending U.S. troops to
Pakistan’s tribal areas drew angry reactions from Pakistani authorities
and analysts said it would further destabilize the country. Imran Khan,
chairman of the opposition party Tehreek-e-Insaf in Pakistan, says
political negotiations are the only way to deal with terrorism.
Gunaratna, too, says a military solution is not the answer. A “strategy
to manage the threat of terrorism is to co-opt the groups that are in
the margins, in the periphery,” he says, “and draw them to mainstream
politics to create opportunities for them.”
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